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Pitmon v. State, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 16 (Mar. 26, 2015)1
CONSITUTIONAL LAW: VAGUENESS AND DUE PROCESS
Summary
The Court determined that (1) NRS 176.035(1) was not unconstitutionally vague, (2) is
its grant of discretion to district court judges was not unconstitutionally arbitrary, and (3)
Nevada’s sentencing scheme does provide meaning appellate review of district court sentencing.
Background
Pitmon was originally charged in three separate cases with multiple counts of attempted
lewdness with a child under the age of 14 for allegedly fondling the genitals of multiple 4-yearold children over the course of many years. Two of the cases were consolidated into one case
(the “first case”), to which Pitmon plead guilty to one count. The remaining counts were
dropped except for one count (the “instant case”), to which Pitmon also plead guilty.
Before sentencing, Pitmon underwent psychological testing and was determined to be a
high risk of re-offense, making him ineligible for probation. During psychological testing, it was
determined that Pitmon had victimized at least four children over the course of ten years.
For the first case, Pitmon was given the maximum sentence—imprisonment for a
minimum 8-year term with a maximum of 20 years. Two days later, Pitmon was sentenced in
the instant case and again given the maximum sentence. The district court judge ordered this
term be served consecutively with his prior sentence.

Discussion
NRS 176.035(1) provides that a district court may impose consecutive subsequent
sentences. Pitmon did not argue that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a
consecutive sentence. Rather, Pitmon makes three constitutional arguments. First, Pitmon
argues that NRS 176.035(1) is unconstitutionally vague in violation of his due process right
under the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Second, Pitmon argues that the statute lacks meaningful
guidance or a specific standard for the district court in imposing consecutive versus concurrent
sentencing, leading to arbitrary imposition. Finally, Pitmon argues that the Nevada sentencing
scheme lacks meaningful appellate review.
As to Pitmon’s first argument, the Court analyzed NRS 176.035(1) and found it to be
straightforward. The statute clearly states that the district court may impose consecutive
subsequent sentences if it so chooses. The Court found that language of NRS 176.035(1) is plain
and unambiguous, and meant to give district courts discretion in imposing consecutive sentences.
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U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV; additionally, NEV. CONST. ART. 1, § 8, cl. 5 also provides that no person shall be
deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
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In arriving at this conclusion, the Court analyzed the legislative history of NRS 176.035(1), as
well as subsequent revisions.3
As to Pitmon’s second argument, the Court found that allowing district courts discretion
to making case specific determinations on imposing sentences concurrently or consecutively did
not render the statute’s application arbitrary. The Court stated those who choose to commit
multiple offenses should reasonably anticipate the possibility, and perhaps the high likelihood,
that they will face consecutive terms. To expect otherwise would favor those who commit
multiple crimes over those that commit one.
Finally, the Court stated sentencing is reviewable on appeal when the district court abuses
its discretion. If the record demonstrates a sentence is the result of prejudice or accusations not
supported by the facts, the sentence may be reversed on appellate review. Additionally, if the
sentence is so unreasonably disproportionate to the crime that it shocks the conscious of the
court, it may also be reversed. The Court could not find a compelling argument why the Due
Process Clause requires Nevada appellate courts should have more authority than they currently
posses to review district court sentences.
Conclusion
The Court held that NRS 176.035(1) was not unconditionally vague, nor did the wide
discretion of district courts to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively under the statute
violate the Due Process Clause. Further, the appellate review of sentencing under an abuse of
discretion standard did not violate the Due Process Clause.
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NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.035(1) was originally enacted in 1967. In 1985, the Governor and
Legislature established a “Commission to Establish Suggested Sentences for Felonies” which
revised the statute in 1987. In 2013, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill 71, effective July 2014,
to again update the statute.
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